Later on August 17, an Air Force Reserve Hurricane Hunter reconnaissance mission found a well-defined circulation with strong convection and maximum sustained wind speeds of 40 mph (65 kph) prompting the NHC to name the disturbance Tropical Storm Harvey. Atmospheric conditions for further development of the storm were marginal as warm sea surface temperatures were offset by moderate vertical wind shear. However, Harvey continued to track in a general westward direction as it moved through the Lesser Antilles, including directly across Barbados and St. Vincent on August 18 at tropical storm strength.
The following day, NHC meteorologists noted that the structure of Harvey had deteriorated based on a ragged-looking storm evident in satellite imagery (see image on the right) while a Hurricane Hunter mission found a much weakened system with a closed circulation only evident at very low levels in the atmosphere. Through August 19, wind shear continued to tear apart the storm and by the late afternoon it had been downgraded to a tropical depression. The track motion continued in a general westnorthwestward direction across the Caribbean Sea toward Belize and Mexico.
At this time, the forecast computer models showed significant bifurcation: one set of models predicted that wind shear would subside in 24 hours allowing major re-intensification of Harvey prior to it making landfall over Belize or Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula; the other set of models showed that the structure of the storm had decayed so severely that it would not be able to regenerate itself, despite atmospheric conditions becoming significantly more favorable.
Late on August 19, the NHC reported that Harvey had degenerated to such an extent that it was now considered an "open wave" and as a result they ceased issuing advisories on the system. The wave continued to track over the open waters of the western Caribbean Sea before later crossing the Yucatan Peninsula on August 22.
The NHC continued to monitor the wave as it emerged in the Bay of Campeche and Harvey's remnants almost immediately began to re-intensify over very warm sea surface temperatures. The agency began issuing advisories once again on August 23 as a Hurricane Hunter mission found a closed low-level circulation center. The system remained disorganized with an asymmetric pattern evident in satellite imagery despite atmospheric conditions over the western Gulf of Mexico being very favorable. The warm sea surface temperatures combined with low levels of vertical wind shear to allow Harvey to regain its structure and rapidly intensify. In their first advisory on August 23, the NHC first noted the potential for Harvey to make landfall as a hurricane-strength system over the U.S. state of Texas.
As Harvey moved over the western Gulf of Mexico it turned and took a more northerly track for roughly 24 hours through August 24-25 as the system began to strengthen its inner core given the very favorable atmospheric and oceanic conditions. Early on August 24 it was once again upgraded as Tropical Storm Harvey for the second time. Intensification of the system occurred more quickly than forecast and just 12 hours later Hurricane Harvey was named with maximum sustained wind speeds of 85 mph (140 kph) based on data measured by a Hurricane Hunter.
As Harvey attained hurricane intensity its track once again changed direction and it turned to the northnorthwest and toward the Texas coast as the steering currents altered. The intensification rate of the system slowed slightly through the late hours of August 24, but aircraft reconnaissance missions on August 25 continued to find a more powerful cyclone. In fact, the aircraft data found that the system had intensified into a Category 2 storm with 105 mph (165 kph) winds. This strengthening was clearly evident given an improved satellite signature. A deep, strong ring of convection around an intermittent eye feature indicated that the storm was responding to a very favorable atmosphere.
By the late morning of August 25, local National Weather Service (NWS) offices in Brownsville and Corpus Christi began observing Harvey via Doppler radar scans. It was determined that the hurricane had developed a pair of concentric eyewalls. The NHC noted that the concentric eyewalls were proving problematic for their intensity forecasts due to the potential for an eyewall replacement cycle to occur. (During an eyewall replacement cycle the intensity of a hurricane generally decreases or stays stable while the extent of the wind field increases.) The agency continued to warn of the prodigious amount of rainfall expected to fall across a broad swath of east Texas and western Louisiana given the size of Harvey regardless of how intense the storm may be at landfall. At this point, the Weather Prediction Center (WPC) was warning of the possibility of up to 30 inches (762 millimeters) of rain falling in a fiveday span.
Despite the presence of the concentric eyewalls, Harvey continued to intensify through August 25 as its wind speeds increased and central pressure plummeted. During this time, Harvey was traversing over a deep and warm eddy of water. These conditions helped the cyclone become a major hurricane during the afternoon of August 25. In another flight, the Hurricane Hunters measured wind speeds that corresponded to maximum sustained surface winds of 125 mph (205 kph); strong Category 3. Harvey continued to intensify all the way up until its initial landfall into Texas at approximately 10:00 PM CDT local time (03:00 UTC, August 26) as a 130 mph (215 kph) Category 4 strength hurricane. Landfall location was near the town of Rockport, Texas, which is located between Port Aransas and Port O'Connor.
The storm would continue to slow its forward progress after its initial landfall while tracking directly over Rockport and causing extensive wind, storm surge and flood damage across numerous neighboring towns and cities. The NHC would later confirm a second landfall at 01:00 AM CDT August 26 (06:00 UTC) at Copano Bay, Texas as a 125 mph (205 kph) Category 3 system. Throughout the day on August 26, Harvey very gradually began to weaken and lose its wind speed intensity. The storm ceased to contain hurricane-force winds during the afternoon, but maintained an impressive appearance on satellite. Numerous incredibly intense bands of heavy rain and isolated tornadoes accompanied the bands of rain that led to multiple Flash Flood Emergencies -including in the greater Houston metro region. The slow-moving nature of the system prompted the WPC to indicate that isolated areas of Texas could see upwards of 50 inches (1,270 millimeters). This did occur.
Harvey maintained minimal tropical storm-force winds while meandering back into the Gulf of Mexico. The NHC only expected minimal (if any) intensification, primarily due to sea surface temperatures being much cooler given recent upwelling and the intrusion of dry air into Harvey's core. The storm eventually made its final landfall near Cameron, Louisiana on August 30 around 3:00 AM (8:00 UTC) with 45 mph (75 kph) winds. Despite the lack of strong intensification, the storm continued to bring relentless heavy rainfall to parts of Texas and Louisiana. Harvey was expected to finally lose its tropical characteristics by September 2 while its remnants tracked into the Ohio Valley and Northeast. Despite future dissipation, it will take at least a week for flood waters and river levels to recede to normal.
Below is a graphic that shows maximum rainfall totals caused by tropical cyclones -and their remnantsfor each Lower 48 state dating to 1950. Harvey broke the continental US record for rainfall by a tropical cyclone: a total of 60.58 inches (1,538.7 millimeters) of rain was recorded at Nederland, Texas. Reported death tolls varied, though it is believed that at least 88 people were killed; almost all of who were in the greater Houston metro area and as a result of the catastrophic flooding. This total includes those killed directly and indirectly by the event. Dozens of other people were also injured. More than 40,000 people were forced into shelters, and as many as 450,000 people in Texas alone would eventually need assistance. One of the major shelters was established in the George Brown Convention Center in downtown Houston which had an estimated capacity of 5,000. However, more than 9,000 people ended up arriving at the facility. A further 2,000 people sought refuge at the Mo Campbell Education Center in Houston.
Wind Damage
Among the hardest hit areas by Harvey's winds was the town of Rockport which bore the brunt of the hurricane's landfall. The local mayor reported "widespread destruction" on the morning of August 26. The town was under a mandatory evacuation order prior to the arrival of Harvey which included the evacuation of inmates from the local jail. At least one person was killed and 12 others were injured in Rockport. Local media reports indicated that as many as nine others were still missing. Images on local media showed trailers and mobile homes which had been tossed about, toppled and snapped power poles and trees, roofs torn from homes and other buildings, properties that had been impaled by trees and extensive debris strewn across roads, sidewalks, yards, car parks, and other open spaces.
Portions of the town's high school were also destroyed as was an emergency medical post. Severe damage was also reported to the library and other public facilities. Officials struggled to coordinate a rescue response due to extensive outages in power supplies and telecommunications while local media speculated that some residents may be trapped inside collapsed buildings.
Numerous towns and cities to the south of Rockport, including Corpus Christi, also fared badly as reports indicated that hundreds of mobile homes were destroyed. Officials in Port Aransas reported early on August 28 that most structures in the city had been "compromised to some level". They also noted that although a mandatory evacuation order was in place for the town's 3,800 residents, as many as 100 people stayed behind. They were all accounted for by late on August 26. Following extensive searches of the town there was only one confirmed fatality there.
To the north of Rockport, extensive damage was noted in the town of Refugio as trees and power poles were strewn across streets and impaled in buildings. Multiple homes lost their roofs while at least two mobile homes were destroyed. The town's high school also lost its roof. Extensive damage was also reported from Port Lavaca and Victoria.
The Gulf of Mexico's oil and gas industry was also impacted as refinery shut-downs extended along the coast. Among those to close was Exxon Mobil's Baytown refinery -the second largest in the country. Multiple platforms in the Gulf of Mexico were also evacuated through August 27. A total of 105 production platforms were closed of the 737 in the Gulf. Five rigs were also evacuated while one more was moved from Harvey's path. Ahead of Harvey's arrival, three refineries and two petrochemical plants were closed causing many gas stations to run out of gasoline and pushing prices to their highest levels in four months. Disruption to the supply caused by Harvey is likely to push prices even higher in coming months according to analysts.
Along the Texas coast it was reported that 313,000 customers were left without power in the aftermath of Harvey's landfall. A major portion of those outages were in the Corpus Christi area
Severe Weather
Additionally Harvey spawned multiple tornadoes when it came ashore. The Storm Prediction Center received 33 reports of tornadoes from August 25-30. These reports were filtered to remove duplicates.
The reported twisters were all in Texas (22) and Louisiana (11).
Tornado touchdowns were reported from Brazoria, Brazos, Calhoun, Fort Bend, Galveston, Hardin, Harris, Jefferson, Matagorda, Waller, and Wharton Counties, Texas, and from Acadia, Cameron, Forrest, Iberia, Lafayette, Vermilion, and Vernon Parishes, Louisiana. One tornado touched down in Hackberry, Louisiana early on Saturday (August 26) afternoon but early reports indicated that damage due to the twister was minimal.
Another tornado made at least four touchdowns in the Cypress area of Houston, TX. At least one vehicle was flipped while local emergency responders noted that extensive damage to roofs had occurred. Tornadic damage to homes, vehicles, businesses, and other buildings was also noted around Matagorda.
One oil spill was noted as the result of severe weather generated by Harvey: a bolt of lightning struck a fiberglass storage container prompting it to ignite on August 27. An estimated 210 gallons (795 liters) of oil was released at a facility operated by Karbuhn Oil Company.
Storm damage in Corpus Christi, TX (Source: US Coast Guard)
Tornadoes observed on August 25-28 (Source: NOAA)
Flood Damage
The majority of the damage inflicted by Harvey was as a result of catastrophic flooding inflicted by the combination of a large storm surge and prodigious amounts of rainfall as the storm pulled warm, moist air from the Gulf of Mexico over the Texas coast for days following its landfall. The NWS reported that conditions were "unprecedented" and issued a flash flood emergency for the entire Houston metro area.
River levels rose rapidly prompting widespread and devastating floods. Among the worst affected areas was Harris County, including the Houston metro area. By early on August 27, NWS meteorologists were already describing the floods as the "worst Houston had ever experienced" and official guidance from emergency management teams to people whose homes became inundated was to "get on the roof". Another NWS official described the situation as "catastrophic", "historic", and "epic".
In a Civil Emergency Message released at 6:10 AM CT August 27 (12:10 UTC), the following message was transmitted at the request of the city of Houston:
"Emergency management officials have requested that people escaping flood waters as a last resort do not stay in the attic. If highest floor of your home becomes dangerous… get on the roof."
Controlled releases of water from two dams (Addicks and Barker) in the western part of Harris County began on August 28. Both dams were designed to withstand 1-in-1,000 year flood events. The release worsened flooding in several neighborhoods but was deemed necessary to avoid bigger, uncontrolled flows from occurring later. Despite the increased outflow from the dams, the spillway of Addicks Reservoir was overtopped by rising water level at approximately 07:19AM CDT on August 29. The Coast Guard reported they were receiving more than 1,000 calls per hour for assistance at the peak of the event. Several reports circulated in local media of boat-owners in the Houston area undertaking unofficial rescue missions as emergency services were overwhelmed. By August 28, the entire Texas National Guard, comprised of 12,000 members, was activated, while FEMA deployed 1,800 staff. By August 30, a further 10,000 National Guard troops from across the U.S. had been deployed to Texas taking the total number deployed there to approximately 24,000.
Houston's George Bush International Airport and William P. Hobby Airports were closed due to flooded runways affecting thousands of flights. Multiple ports were also closed, through Monday, August 28 at the earliest, including those at Houston, Galveston, Texas City, Freeport, and Corpus Christi. Lists of road closures throughout Houston and the surrounding areas were endless and grew by the hour. At one point, more than 250 roads, highways, and interstates were shut. On August 28, around 220,000 customers were left without power in the Houston area alone.
While most of the focus remained on Houston, the flooding disaster in Beaumont and Port Arthur, Texas was also substantial. Exceptional flooding left both cities reeling. In Beaumont alone, the flooding was so severe that both water pumps had failed; leaving the city of nearly 120,000 entirely without running water. The pumps were not fixed until the water fully receded. The flooding was also blamed on causing the Arkema plant to have multiple chemical explosions in the nearby town of Crosby. The twin blasts on August 31 occurred after organic peroxides overheated. The chemicals require being kept cool, but Arkema lost power on August 27 and that caused temperatures to rise in the storage facility; prompting containers to pop and catch fire. On August 30, the Motiva Enterprises plant in Port Arthur, Texas began a complete shutdown. The plant is the biggest oil refinery in the country and had already been running at half-speed prior to the full closure. In total more than one-fifth of U.S. refining capacity had been shuttered by August 30 prompting a rise in gasoline prices. Analysts estimated that it may take up to two weeks or longer before normal operations could resume.
An oil spill occurred at Kinder Morgan's Pasadena Terminal on August 26 as a result of a storage tank being tilted due to large volumes of floodwaters. The amount of oil spilled was not confirmed but the tank had a capacity of 6.3 million gallons (24 million liters). Officials reported that they believed the spill was contained. Two further oil spills were reported on August 30 by Burlington Resources Oil and Gas in DeWitt County. One of the spills was a 16,170 gallon (61,210 liter) spill near Westhoff and the other was a 13,272 gallon (50,240 liter) spill near Hochheim. In addition, an 8,500 gallon (32,175 liter) barrel of wastewater was also spilled.
Beyond structural damage, there was substantial impact to a high volume of automobiles, infrastructure and agriculture. Those damage costs were well into the billions of dollars.
To provide greater context to automobiles specifically, reports from multiple automotive industry groups indicate that as many as 500,000 (or more) vehicles were damaged by Harvey. Of particular interest was in Beauregard Parish, where all residents along the Sabine River were requested by local officials to evacuate their homes. Hundreds of roads throughout the hardest-hit parishes were closed given high water levels. As of August 31, river levels were continuing to rise as smaller creeks and streams were draining into the larger watershed. AEP Texas, the largest energy provider affected by Hurricane Harvey, sustained significant damage to its network and infrastructure and more than 220,000 AEP Texas customers experienced outages. Additionally, one member of the company's restoration crew lost their life undertaking work to restore power supplies: approximately 5,600 personnel in total were involved in the company's restoration effort. AEP Texas reported that more than 5,000 distribution poles had to be replaced due to damage inflicted by the hurricane; approximately 300 transmission structures were knocked down and required to be replaced or repaired; and a further 200 transmission structures were damaged by the storm. They noted that Harvey inflicted the most severe damage to their network in 44 years.
CenterPoint Energy also sustained significant damage to their network causing outages for some 878,000 of their customers in total. CenterPoint's outages peaked at 120,000 at once on August 28. The estimated rebuilding cost of their Memorial substation which was inundated when the Buffalo Bayou overflowed was USD15 million. The substation served approximately 12,500 customers and was submerged by four feet (1.2 meters) of floodwater. A further five of the company's substations were also flooded in the Houston area.
Natural Gas
On September 1, CenterPoint Energy notified authorities of a natural gas leak from an 18-inch (0.5-meter) diameter underwater pipe in the Neches River, Beaumont, TX which was quickly and successfully isolated by dive teams. Woodsboro Natural Gas also reported six leaks, all of which had been repaired by September 2. 
Offshore Energy Platforms
Despite Harvey tracking through a region of the Gulf of Mexico full of offshore oil and gas platforms, there was not widespread damage to these facilities. However, in advance of Harvey's arrival, the U.S. Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) reported that 105 production platforms -or 14 percent of the 737 manned platforms in the Gulf of Mexico -had been evacuated.
Offshore Production
From August 26-27, the peak of disruption to oil and gas production in the Gulf of Mexico was noted with 24.5 percent of oil production (428,568 barrels per day) and 25.9 percent of natural gas production (835 million cubic feet per day) shut-in according to estimates by the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. These figures slowly and steadily dropped through the end of August and into September as detailed in the table below. 
U.S. Gulf of Mexico Oil & Gas Production

Onshore Production
The Texas Railroad Commission estimated on August 26 that approximately 300,000 to 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil production had been shut-in in the Eagle Ford region. That was down from a preHarvey production estimate of 870,000 barrels per day. Additionally they noted that 3.0 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas production was shut-in which was approximately half of the pre-Harvey production capacity.
Petroleum Refineries
Multiple refineries were also shut down throughout Texas due to Harvey. In the Corpus Christi area, six refineries with a combined refining capacity of 924,720 barrels per day (equivalent to 18.4 percent of the total Gulf Coast refining capacity) were closed. Four refineries in the Houston/Galveston area were operating at reduced capacities as of August 26, two of which began the process of shutting down on August 27 taking the combined refining capacity of the closed facilities to 1,810,920 barrels per day; equivalent to 36.0 percent of the total Texas Gulf Coast refining capacity. The following day a further two refineries in Houston/Galveston began shutting down taking the total capacity of closed or closing refineries to 2,170,149 barrels per day or equivalent to 43.2 percent of total Texas Gulf Coast refining capacity. This figure was also equivalent to 11.8 percent of the total U.S. refining capacity. Additionally, as of August 28, three more refineries in Houston/Galveston and one in Beaumont/Port Arthur were operating at reduced levels.
As of August 29, six refineries in the Corpus Christi area, seven in Houston/Galveston, and one in Beaumont/Port Arthur were shutdown. The combined capacity of these refineries was 3,268,449 barrels per day, equal to 33.7 percent of Gulf Coast refining capacity and 17.6 percent of total U.S. capacity. Furthermore, one refinery in Houston/Galveston, two in Beaumont/Port Arthur, and two in Lake Charles were operating at reduced rates. The following day, another Beaumont/Port Arthur refinery was added to the list of closures taking the affected capacity to 3,871,449 barrels per day or 39.9 percent of total Gulf Coast capacity: 20.9 percent of total U.S. capacity.
August 28, saw the first Corpus Christi refinery begin startup operations. Further startups were initiated on August 30 when six refineries with a capacity of 1,269,720 barrels per day (or 13.1 percent of Gulf Coast refining capacity) began the process. As of September 1, four refineries were operating at reduced capacities, six had initiated the startup process, and 10 remained shut down.
By September 4, eight refineries remained shut down with a combined capacity of 2,110,229 barrels per day -equal to 21.8 percent of the total Gulf Coast refining capacity or 11.4 percent of the total U.S. refining capacity. A further eight refineries had begun the process of restarting while four refineries remained operational at reduced levels.
The numbers of refineries operating at reduced capacities or shut down decreased gradually through September 11 as restart operations continued. At that time just four remained closed while seven were restarting. A further four were operating at reduced rates. By the end of September, one refinery with a capacity of 225,000 barrels per day (equal to just 2.3 percent of the total Gulf Coast capacity or 1.2 percent of the total U.S. capacity) was in the process of restarting and a further eight were operating at reduced rate. The combined capacity of the eight was 2,661,470 barrels per day or 27.5 percent of the total Gulf Coast refining capacity or 14.4 percent of the total U.S. refining capacity.
At the peak, 15 oil refinery plants in the Houston area and Corpus Christi were shut down that led to a 50 percent greater reduction in refining capacity than was lost during Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Ports
From August 25-26, the U.S. Coast Guard closed all ports in the Corpus Christi and Houston & Galveston sectors. This included Brownsville, Corpus Christi, Freeport, Galveston, Houston, and Texas City. Additionally, ports in Port Arthur and Lake Charles sector were open but with operational restrictions in place. These included Beaumont, Lake Charles, Orange, Port Arthur, and Sabine Pass. By August 28, all Port Arthur and Lake Charles sector ports were closed.
Also on August 28, it was reported that 22 oil tankers with a cargo of 15.3 million barrels of imported crude oil were unable to offload due to the extensive port closures along the Texas coast. This number increased to 25 the following day and to 55 by September 4. The affected vessels remained in anchorage off the Texan ports of Corpus Christi, Houston, Galveston, Freeport, Texas City, Beaumont, Nederland, Port Arthur, Port Neches and Sabine Pass and the Louisiana port of Lake Charles. 
Transportation Impacts Airports & Airlines
The impact to the airline industry was substantial as more than 12,000 flights ended up being cancelled nationwide due to Harvey. Most of those flights came in and out of Houston's two main airports (George Bush Intercontinental Airport and Hobby Airport) as the airports were closed for nearly five days. Hobby Airport's runways were flooded during the peak of the event; while roads leading to George Bush Airport were inundated. Other affected Texas airports were in San Antonio and Austin.
Numerous airlines cited significant financial impacts from Harvey due to lost business. United Airlines reportedly lost up to USD265 million alone. Other airlines lost less, such as Southwest (USD77 million) and Spirit (USD11 million), though impacts were costly.
Roadways
At the peak of the flooding that was spawned by Hurricane Harvey, the Texas Department of Transport noted that more 500 roads were closed throughout the state. As of October 16, only one road remained closed due to damage: Park Road 1C in Buescher State Park, Bastrop County. Also at this time, the department noted that more than 4,300 bridges had been inspected following Harvey of which 13 required repairs. The federal government diverted USD25 million of funds to the Department of Transport to aid with the response to Hurricane Harvey.
The Department of Transport additionally carried out extensive debris removal work across multiple counties and cities. As of October 16, they had collected more than 10 million cubic feet (283,000 cubic meters) of debris from just four of the worst affected districts.
Railways
Kansas City Southern Railway declared force majeure (defined as unforeseeable circumstances that prevent from fulfilling a contract) and an embargo on shipments through Laredo and BrownsvilleMatamoros going to Houston and Corpus Christi on August 25. Three days later they declared force majeure and an embargo on the remainder of its Texas network that was affected by Hurricane Harvey.
Union Pacific reported on August 30 that sections of its track were out of service in 18 of its 28 Houston subdivisions and it was diverting traffic along alternate routes through Longview and Dallas. Part of Union Pacific's Englewood Yard was flooded. BNSF reported on August 29 that normal train flows in the Harvey-affected region were unlikely to resume for "an extended period" while CSX Corp. noted that it was closing monitoring its network throughout Louisiana. YRC Freight's Houston terminal was closed from August 29. From September 1 ABF Freight noted that there were disruptions to its services in Houston, Dallas, Little Rock, and San Antonio due to Harvey.
Marine Industry Boats
The impact from Harvey on recreational boats was significant, though not as catastrophic as initially feared. A study by BoatUS -a recreational boat industry organization -found that roughly 13,500 boats were damaged or destroyed in Texas and Louisiana. This equaled an economic cost of USD155 million. For context, this was much less than the 65,000 boats and loss of more than USD650 million during 2012's Hurricane Sandy in the US Northeast.
Marinas
Cove Harbor Marina and Drystack, just south of Rockport, TX reported that they took a direct hit from Harvey and as such, sustained significant damage. More than 400 boat tenants were affected although it was not known exactly how many vessels were damaged or destroyed. Significant damage to the marina's infrastructure was noted and the drystack building was tagged for demolition due to the extent of damage sustained. Damage was estimated at USD10 million.
Further damage was cited around Port Lavaca, where officials counted 77 sunken boats in the region. This was a fraction of the 676 boats which sank in Texas waters as Harvey slowly traversed the state. Rockport Harbor also took a direct hit from Harvey and sustained significant damage. Additionally, the neighboring Rockport Aquarium was all but destroyed, and ultimately had to be demolished.
Key Allegro Marina in Rockport also endured severe damage: at least two of their docks were destroyed. It was noted that serious damage was also sustained to buildings at the facility. Environmental Impacts
Coastal Erosion
Harvey was responsible for severe erosion all along the central and northern Texas coastline. Impacts from storm surge and prolonged elevated water levels led to major dune overwash, breaching, and erosion. However, it is worth noting that the Texas General Land Office has cited that 64 percent of the Texas coast was previously eroding at an average rate of 6.0 feet (1.8 meters) per year. Some locations in the state are losing more than 30 feet (9.1 meters) per year, which is accelerated due to continued coastal growth, sea level rise and other natural factors.
Flora & Fauna
Harvey caused damage of USD104 million to the University of Texas' Marine Science Institute at Port Aransas and killed hundreds of study animals (mainly fish) and displaced 14 researchers. Damaged facilities included the loss of one of five water quality monitoring stations, heavy damage to a rehabilitation keep for injured wildlife, and the loss of part of the roof of the headquarters building which allowed for significant water damage to occur as heavy rain poured into the building.
The Marine Science Institute additionally carried out post-Harvey research on the impact the hurricane had on seagrass communities in the Gulf of Mexico in an area extending from Galveston to Port Isabel. Their immediate studies focused on areas that had been exposed to hurricane-force winds including the Upper Laguna Madre to Aransas and Copano Bay. When compared to baseline data that the team had collected for years prior to Harvey they found that about half of the Coastal Bend's seagrass meadows were impacted to a greater or lesser degree.
They noted that some stations were largely unscathed while others had been striped to their roots and rhizomes. They also added that Harvey had significantly reduced the salinity of the water in coastal regions from approximately 30-35 parts per thousand to 9-13 parts per thousand. Seagrass does not thrive when salinity levels are below 15 parts per thousand for prolonged periods. Further studies by the team are expected to concentrate on the recovery of the established seagrass meadows. Harris County also worked closely with the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to substantially upgrade and enlarge the county's system of rainwater-draining bayous. In all, more than USD900 million was spent on upgrading Sims Bayou in South Houston, Brays Bayou in western and central Houston, and White Oak Bayou in northwest Houston. In the 16 years since Allison, there have been numerous flash flooding events -in addition to Hurricane Ike in 2008 -which tested these new initiatives. For the most part, the new storm plans and infrastructure improvements had worked well.
Perhaps the biggest difference in the Houston metro area since Allison has been the explosive boom in population and exposure.
Tropical Storm Allison
June [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 2001 Allison rainfall (top) versus Harvey (bottom) -Source: NOAA Hurricane Harvey 32
Miscellaneous NFIP Coverage
The graphic below shows NFIP coverage by county across the hardest-hit areas by Harvey. The data is based on statistics from NFIP and the U.S. Census Bureau at the time of landfall. In Harris County, TXhome to the city of Houston -just one out of six homes currently had active NFIP policies in place. The rates of coverage are most pronounced immediately along the coastline, but decline into the single-digits once getting further inland.
Housing Unit Growth
The graphic below shows an absolute increase in number of housing units per county since 2000 across the affected area. The highest increase of exposure in the last 16 years can be detected in Harris County (city of Houston) and across surrounding counties of greater Houston. Second highest increase can be observed further inland in a cluster of counties around Bexar (San Antonio) and Travis (Austin).
Population Growth
The spatial distribution of recent population growth in the affected area correlates with focal points of housing development and is concentrated in large cities of Houston, San Antonio and Austin and across their metropolitan areas.
Impact Forecasting Reconnaissance Trip Among the most notable findings:
1) There was a significant difference in areas with a mixture of homes built Pre-FIRM (Flood Insurance Rate Map) and those with newer construction in modern FEMA map zones. Homes which were elevated to meet current mandates often escaped without major damage. However, Pre-FIRM homes that were grandfathered with previous code standards often incurred entire loss to their first floor contents.
2) The height and longevity of flood waters across many neighborhoods and commercial regions led to significant molding and weakening of dry wall. The combination of tropical heat and humidity in Houston additionally worsened structures that did not have much external circulation. This often led to a loss of contents on the second story.
Home without any foundation elevation (Source: Impact Forecasting) Home built with 12-18" elevation (Source: Impact Forecasting)
First floor remnants following 2' of water (Source: Impact Forecasting) Molding on walls (Source: Impact Forecasting)
3) Significant flooding occurred in areas even where local officials had properly planned for at least a 100-year flood event. Given the extensive volume of new construction and concrete throughout Houston metro, the current infrastructure was not prepared to handle more than 60 inches of rainfall. This led to major flash flooding and inundation. The dominant soil type (clay) and excessive amount of concrete additionally provided further risk for flash flooding.
4) Dozens of tornado touchdowns during Hurricane Harvey led to roof damage in multiple neighborhoods. In some instances, roof damage was severe enough to allow for indoor water intrusion that led to an entire loss of indoor contents.
5) Water heights reached up to 8 feet in numerous neighborhoods, making ground rescue impossible. This led to some residents needing to be rescued from their roofs via helicopter after holes were punctured through attics. 
Storm Surge
The importance of coastal and inland flood driving a larger portion of loss than wind from Harvey highlights the need to be able to effectively model storm surge -both for post-loss risk assessment and as part of a pre-loss stochastic evaluation of portfolio risk. In order to do this, Impact Forecasting has implemented the SLOSH methodology into its loss calculation platform, ELEMENTS.
What is SLOSH?
According to the National Hurricane Center, the Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) model is a computerized numerical model developed by the National Weather Service (NWS) to estimate storm surge heights resulting from historical, hypothetical, or predicted hurricanes by taking into account atmospheric pressure, size, forward speed, and track data. These parameters are used to create a model of the wind field which drives the storm surge. The SLOSH model consists of a set of physics equations which are applied to a specific locale's shoreline, incorporating unique bay and river configurations, water depths, bridges, roads, levees, and other physical features.
Impact Forecasting Storm Tide Heights Using SLOSH Impact Forecasting has a suite of catastrophe models that analyze the financial implications of catastrophic events so that our clients achieve a greater understanding of their risks. To estimate the potential "insurable losses" for Hurricane Harvey, presented in the next section of this report, Impact Forecasting used this implementation of SLOSH, as well as its hurricane wind model and riverine and pluvial inland flood model, through its in-house ELEMENTS platform. The following maps show predicted inundation along the Texas and Louisiana coastlines. The estimates are based on actual parameters from Harvey, including official height data as measured by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the USGS. As a reminder, data used for storm tide is water height above the North American Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD88). Note that this is different from inundation, which is the measured water height above ground level after high tide that occurs as a result of the storm tide. To see a full glossary of tropical cyclonerelated terms see Appendix D.
Wind
The full track of Hurricane Harvey was reconstructed using the preliminary best-track data from the National Hurricane Center's Automated Tropical Cyclone Forecasting system (ATCF). The ATCF, developed by the US Naval Research Laboratory, is a computer based application designed to automate and optimize the forecasting process of tropical cyclones. The NHC and the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC), among other institutes, are the operational users of the ATCF.
The parameters utilized in the reconstruction included the position of hurricane eye (latitude and longitude), minimum central pressure, forward speed, heading angle, and radius of maximum winds that were reported in 6-hour increments. These hurricane parameters were imported into the wind field and the storm surge models to calculate wind speeds and surge heights. These wind speeds and surge heights were next used in Impact Forecasting's ELEMENTS program to estimate the potential insurable losses caused by the hurricane.
The Impact Forecasting wind field model is a spectral-based parametric model that solves equations of motion by using the finite difference method. The wind field model has been calibrated, both spatially and temporally, to the surface winds. The wind speed footprint, as modeled by Impact Forecasting, for Hurricane Harvey is presented on the right. This footprint has general agreements with the wind speed swath from the NHC.
Inland Flood (Riverine & Flash Flood) Given the substantial rainfall associated with Hurricane Harvey, Impact Forecasting additionally ran its inland flood model. The inland flood results show areas impacted by both pluvial (flash flood) and fluvial (riverine) flooding and were constructed using Impact Forecasting's 1D riverine and 2D hydrodynamic rainfall-runoff model. In order to run the model, real-time stream gauge discharge observations were collected for the impacted regions. Due to a number of stream gauges failing during the peak of the event, corrections were made in order to include them in the calibration process.
Some areas recorded rainfall rates with an estimated return period in excess of 1,000 years. This means that there was a 0.1 percent chance (1/1,000 probability) that the recorded rainfall would occur at any given location in any year. Given the rainfall rates, Impact Forecasting used pre-calculated return period flash flood events to construct the Harvey rainfall extent. The final inland flood extents are shown on the next page. From an insurance point of view, as mentioned previously, the relative lack of NFIP coverage in some of the hardest-hit areas meant that an abnormally high portion of economic damage caused by flooding was not covered by insurance. Hurricanes have historically shown a roughly 50 percent ratio of insured-toeconomic loss damage. However, hurricane losses that are primarily driven by coastal or inland flood tend to show lower percentages of coverage. Hurricane Matthew in 2016 only had roughly 40 percent of the overall economic cost covered by public and private insurance entities as most of the damage resulted from considerable inland flooding in North Carolina and South Carolina.
Insured losses resulting from Harvey were thus also significantly less than the overall economic cost. At roughly USD30 billion, this meant that only 30 percent of the financial cost was covered by public and private insurers. This was almost entirely due to most of the damage resulting from extreme flooding in the Houston metro area, as opposed to wind. A statement from FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program cited that claims payouts were well into the billions, and could reach as high as USD11 billion. Additional losses were incurred by the onshore and offshore energy industry.
Harvey was the costliest hurricane to strike the state of Texas. It surpassed Hurricane Ike in September 2008. Ike cost the United States at least USD35 billion in economic damage; while public and private insurers paid more than USD20 billion (2017 USD). It also far surpassed losses from 2001's Tropical Storm Allison -which was previously considered the worst flood event in Houston's recorded history. In fact, Harvey's rainfall surpassed Allison in nearly half the time (2-3 days compared to five days). Allison cost an estimated USD12 billion in economic damage (2017 USD). Less than half of that cost (USD5.0 billion, 2017 USD) was covered by insurance.
Bottom line: Hurricane Harvey was one of the costliest natural disasters in United States history, second only to 2005's Hurricane Katrina. The full scope and magnitude of the damage and humanitarian impact was enormous and the economic impact was substantial.
In terms of tropical cyclone development, the official Atlantic Hurricane season runs from June 1 to November 30 -though tropical cyclones have been known to develop during any month. As seen in the graphics below, the most likely months for cyclogenesis are during the peak months of August, September, and October. During these months, atmospheric and oceanic conditions are climatologically the most conducive for cyclones being influenced and/or steered by a strong Atlantic ridge of high pressure and/or by the advancement of strong troughs that dig into the central and eastern United States.
The caveat to cyclogenesis is, of course, the eventual track of storms that do develop. While greater frequency of storms increases the chance of US landfall, the reality is that it only takes one landfalling storm to entirely change the perception of how active a season is to the general public -regardless of how many storms actually make landfall in a single season.
